Amazon’s awareness dwarfs legacy retail competitors

ronburgundyI’ve been working to get my head around the future of the global retail. On one hand, we can always look to the number of stores or the revenue generated along with history and customer loyalty a particular retailer may have. On the other hand, it’s apparent to me that none of that matters. There are many, many brands and retailers that were once dominant yet no longer exist. Many more are ghosts of their formal selves. And fewer still are doing well.

The truth of the matter is that determining the path towards the future, along with who may or may not be successful in blazing along that path, has much more to do with who has mindshare and who is innovating than anything else. Luck has no place in the future. Complacency and mediocrity even less so. What we’re seeing is  a rapid shift from a store-based retail model to a digital retail model. Searching on the web allows us to find and consume practically anything at this point. It’s only a matter of time where there will be little need to go to a store. Why waste time going to a store when we can enjoy friends, family, life, and adventure.

This being the case, it’s apparent to me that one of the single most important things in terms of brand recognition is search interest. Do people go on Google and search for your brand, products, or services? Keyword search is vital, and all that information is trackable. So in understanding which brands or retailers have potential for future success, its necessary to understand search interest. Search interest is exactly as it sounds. What are people searching for? How are searches trending? Are they accelerating? Are they stable? Are the declining? In any of these cases we want to understand why because a big factor is that search is only temporary. As artificial intelligence advances, we won’t have to search because we can just ask.

Search interest is a powerful tool in understanding a brand’s future potential

Search interest is an incredible asset. In this post we’ll see how quickly something can go from no awareness to giant awareness in little time. We’ll also see how search interest can be migrated into other more solid forms of retained loyalty like native apps that become core to the user. And finally we’ll see how search interest among the 800 pound gorillas can be discordant and may show leading indicators of future success or failure.

Google is a pretty amazing technology to do exactly this since the vast majority of searches go through its engines. With Google, we can compare and contrast keyword searches over a period of time. This interest over time shows us a relative comparison how people searched for a keyword over a period of time.

Google’s formula for interest over time is the equivalent of the number of queries for a particular keyword that is searched divided by the number of total Google searches. Google’s own definition is “numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Likewise a score of 0 means the term was less than 1% as popular as the peak.”

Let’s take a look at search interest for Amazon over a period of time. The chart below shows search interest during the 10-year period from February 2007 to February 2017. In this chart you can see that interest in Amazon has been growing steadily since February 2007. The peaks of interest you see are during the holiday selling season during the month of December each year. Clearly Amazon has significant peaks for Christmas selling and it likewise appears that those peaks are becoming somewhat greater.

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A key point here is that we can see that Amazon’s peak search period was during the most recent holiday selling period in December 2016. That’s represented by the peak value of 100. To contrast that, we can see that interest the year before was slightly less at about 93. Likewise holiday selling back in 2007 was significantly lower at 44.

Now here’s the tricky part, Google normalizes these results so they are all compared to the highest point in the entire range. So while that doesn’t tell us how much people searched for in a given period, it does tell us in relative value what each period is to the peak. Hence December 2007 was 44% of the peak value in December 2017, and December 2016 was 93% of December 2017. No matter how you look at it, interest in Amazon has grown significantly during the past decade and it appears to be continuing to grow.

I should also point out that we should expect that when a business launches a native app, search would expectedly decline relative to the success of the app. In Amazon’s case, it launched its native app for Android devices in March 2011. Over the years the app has been rolled out across iOS devices as well and it’s been very successful. While exact figures are not available, it’s been reported that more than 70% of Amazon’s shoppers were on mobile devices during the holiday selling season of 2015, and more than half of those shoppers were using the native app. Those searches would not be reported in these Google search results. That makes this chart showing acceleration of search interest for Amazon even more compelling.

To contrast this further, a good example of how a native app can dramatically effect search interest is Facebook. We can see in this next chart that peak search interest for Facebook was December 2012. We can also see that Facebook had relatively no interest in 2007 compared to the peak in 2012. interest-over-time-004Its rise from nothing to its current user base of almost 2 billion is extraordinary.

This chart shows what demand on steroids looks like. Since 2013 however, there appears to be a significant decrease in search interest for Facebook. Again let’s keep in mind that this data is related to Google search results so if someone is going directly to a native app, there is no search result. Some of Facebook’s decrease in interest could of course be due to a real decrease of interest, but that’s hard to gauge and imagine since its user base continues to grow, albeit slower as it approaches 2 billion.

What’s very important to understand in this case is that Facebook began focusing efforts on its mobile apps during the 2012 and 2013 period. Much of that traction didn’t happen immediately, and we can see that from 2014 onward a pretty steady decline in search interest occurred. It’s been reported that almost 60% of all Facebook users only login from a mobile device as of July 2016. That statistic is pretty much inline with the decrease in search interest activity since Facebook began focusing on its native app in 2013. On one hand, if I were management at Facebook and saw the above chart I would excuse myself and run for the hills. On the other hand knowing that we replaced those searches with direct login through a native app, I’d be celebrating the people and teams that made that happen.

Once again I think this makes a strong case that Amazon’s meteoric rise in search interest a remarkable feat given that they also have a solid native app presence. While Amazon doesn’t release its membership base, we can do some quick math from its recent 10-K report to learn that it has roughly 65 million Prime members. Amazon Prime members are its key users because they spend the most and more frequently over a given year than do non-prime members. Regardless of the number of total Amazon members, it remains dwarfed compared to Facebook’s 2 billion users. This can only mean that there is tremendous growth potential at Amazon.

Comparing Amazon’s awareness to Macy’s and others

We should expect that Amazon would have a tremendous amount of interest in terms of Google search. Over the years it has become the go-to place to purchase just about everything one needs, and while we enjoy social media like Facebook and Instagram, the dominant place for us all to purchase products we know we want or need is through Amazon. So the question becomes does a store-based business like Macy’s stand a chance competing with Amazon? I’m comparing Macy’s, but this question can be asked about any department store, hardware store, or mass retailer.

Let’s begin by taking a look at search interest for Macy’s during the past 10 years as we did with Amazon and Facebook previously. The first thing we’ll see is that interest in Macy’s is pretty flat. There is little overall growth in interest since 2007, and while we see that Macy’s has similar peak of interest around the Christmas and Holiday selling period in December, for the most part this is a flat line. interest-over-time-002While Amazon shows very impressive acceleration of interest since 2007, Macy’s for the most part hovers the 50% interest index.

This is not good news for Macy’s. In this digital age where more and more consumers are utilizing the web to find things, you would hope to see some improvement in search interest. If you can’t get modern consumers searching for your brand, or have done that and then lead them to an app they utilize as Facebook and Amazon have done, you can be sure that the writing is on the wall regarding your future. The first point therefore, is that a brand like Macy’s is at a tremendous disadvantage to an Amazon because it hasn’t garnered search interest. In due time it’s likely that Amazon, and perhaps Google, will lead consumer’s to it’s AI platform Alexa where what we seek is simply a matter of speaking, not searching. In this regard Amazon, and Google, are easily two steps in front of a legacy retailer like Macy’s. Some form of AI will certainly replace web search soon–why type a search when you can speak a wish?

Now let’s look at search interest overall for Amazon as it compares to a brand like Macy’s. Before we do this however, it’s important that we include a couple of other barometers in order for us to gain a more complete level of understanding. To do this, I have added search interest results on keywords Walmart and iPhone. The reason being is that while Macy’s is small compared to Walmart, Walmart is huge compared Amazon.

Walmart currently generates more than $480 billion annually. Macy’s, on the other hand, generates less than $30 billion. Amazon is in the middle in terms of revenue and generates roughly $136 billion annually. Furthermore, while Walmart generates it’s sales through almost 12,000 stores around the world and it’s website, Macy’s generates it’s sales through 880 stores currently and its website. Macy’s is aggressively reducing its store count and has announced that it will be closing roughly 100 stores this year. Amazon drives practically all its sales through its website and apps, as well as from its web services platform called AWS.

Something else of great importance is that Walmart and Amazon are global businesses while Macy’s is predominately a U.S. based retailer. Not being a global brand is a tremendous disadvantage for any business looking to compete with a digital business like Amazon. I had initially analyzed search interest for these keywords using only U.S. data given that Macy’s is chiefly a U.S. based business. After much thought I felt it vital to understand the significance of these businesses at global reach. With the advent of digital technologies, reaching a global audience is a necessity. Amazon has been using its profits to invest in additional technologies and facilities that it believes will help it be the dominant supplier of goods and services around the world. Rather than investing in physical store locations and inventory, Amazon has invested in technology and distribution capabilities so it can market and deliver globally. Being able to gain brand awareness around the world is of critical value to any brand or business looking to swim in the pools of our modern age.

From a shear volume standpoint, Walmart is clearly the 800 pound gorilla. Amazon, on the other hand, would likely be at least one of the 800 pound gorilla along with Walmart in terms of web search. Neither of those two facts should surprise us. But what happens when we compare the Amazon and Walmart in terms of digital mindshare and awareness? Are they similar given that they are both 800 pounds gorillas, albeit in different retrospectives? Or are they completely discordant? More importantly, how much more awareness power do these gorillas have compared to another significant retailer like Macy’s? From a volume relationship we’d expect Walmart to index at 100 while Amazon indexes at 28.  Likewise we would expect Macy’s to index at about 6 compared to Walmart. To add further contrast and perspective, how would we expect the search interest for iPhone to index compared to this group? The iPhone was launched in 2007 and has since then sold more than 1 billion units globally–surely the keyword iPhone should have tremendous awareness in terms of search interest during this 10 year period.

The results, I think, are startling. Let’s first level-set so we know what we’re about to look at and compare in this next chart. As in the others we will see a peak interest value over a period of time, in this case from February 2007 to February 2017. Since we are comparing different keyword searches over that time period, one of those keyword searches will post its peak value of 100 at its peak time. Our keyword searches are amazon.com, Macy’s, Walmart, and iPhone, and all of these are for global search results since being a global player has much to do with a retailer’s success in this field of comparison. Once the keyword search with the peak data is established over the entire period, all other keyword searches will index from that keyword search’s peak index. Kapish?

Are you ready? Here it is:

interest-over-time-007

The first thing we see in the chart above is the growth of search interest in Amazon.com. From 2007 until 2017 it has gained traction and grown stronger despite the fact that many of its member are utilizing the native app. At the other end of this extreme, we see that Macy’s has virtually no awareness compared to Amazon. While Amazon has grown exponentially since 2007, Macy’s has remained essentially unchanged and minuscule compared to the others. We also see that awareness of Walmart is significantly less than Amazon. In fact, Amazon’s peak search interest in December 2007 was 2X the peak interest of Walmart in 2007, but by 2017 Amazon’s peak search interest was 3X Walmart’s. Walmart has some work to especially if Amazon figures out how to bring AI to the home and stunt any need to visit a big box store in the future.

What’s highly interesting is that we can use iPhone search interest as a base for these comparisons. If any keyword search was emblematic of digital search for this timeframe, iPhone would be it. The iPhone was brand new in 2007. Despite that fact, it outperformed Macy’s! More remarkable is within a year, the awareness and interest of iPhone was greater than Walmart. That’s pretty astonishing for iPhone. It came out of no where and we can see the power of digital search in the reach it has to propel and brand or product forward in this digital age.

I’d like to also point out however, that we also see a flattening of search interest on iPhone since 2011. That, in and of itself, isn’t necessarily surprising, but recent press has noted that Apple’s stock is at it’s all-time high because investors believe in the iPhone. You can draw your own conclusion with this information. Buyer beware!

Is there hope for legacy retailers without search interest and innovation?

So how does a significant retailer like Macy’s hold it’s head above water when the tides are so strong? Peak search interest of Amazon was 8X greater than Macy’s in 2007. In 2017 it was 18X greater. If ever there were signs of a drowning victim, this would be it. So what does a significant legacy retailer like Macy’s do to remain afloat? This question can be asked of any significant legacy retailer currently dependent on stores, coupled with lackluster search interest, and little to no entrance into future AI technologies.

This is going to be a hard choice for many. Clearly this post has much more to discuss. Ultimately figuring out WHAT to do is a lot more simple than figuring out HOW to do it? It’s pretty clear what is going to take place in the next few years. The ramifications are significant for legacy retailers, as well as the many brands that have a wholesale business model with them. In fact the entire notion of being a brand will likely be considerably different than what it is today. What may have worked reasonably well a decade ago, will likely be the demise of a brand in the near future.

Until my next post, I’d love to hear thoughts and ideas. My hope is to stimulate deep thinking and ignite conversations that are actionable. As always, I’m looking forward to listening and learning from everyone and all sources.

DON’T SELL, SOLVE — Part 2 of Wholesale isn’t broken series

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One of the key and exciting opportunities for a wholesale brand to consider in order to avoid continued deterioration of its business with department and specialty stores is to move away from a sales and planning organization towards a more proactive partnership that solves the business needs of itself and its wholesale partners.

In my first post in this series, I spoke about how both wholesalers and retailers continue to use and promote a business acumen that is poorly managed, weakly aligned, and severely outdated. A large part of that is the way wholesale brands approach business with their retail partners. If you haven’t read the first series, I encourage you to read it now.

The challenge is, in my opinion, that most wholesalers continue to use sales teams to sell-in product and planning teams to analyze to current selling performance rather than forecasting forward placements. The best brands work to have planning and sales teams in sync in order to most effectively find opportunities that will drive more sales while also ensuring markdowns and margins perform as strong as possible. Wholesale brands that have done this well in the past include Coach, Nike, and Michael Kors. These business worked to manage the presentations, sell-thru, and success of their products through the wholesale channel. They had strong sales and gross margins as did the retailers they sold products through. We did this at Tommy Hilfiger in the 1990’s and likewise had incredible success.

This proactive effort worked well for the industry, but many conditions, including channel disruptions, excessive promotions, and fast-fashion retailers, make these efforts far more complex today. Even the best proactive efforts are falling short from the performance that’s possible through an effective and disciplined wholesale strategy. Worse yet many brands haven’t created these teams to be proactive–they operate reactively by reviewing current selling and respond to internal calls to sell more goods. These knee-jerk reactions ultimately weaken results further. Driving sell-in promotes high gross sales–but markdowns, returns and other promotions to move those goods through the retailers often results in soft net sales and weak gross margins. Product is then blamed for bad performance, people lose their jobs, and brands can’t invest to find innovative ways to grow their businesses.

 

Critical path 1 = DON’T SELL–SOLVE.

The brand of the future needs to be a problem-solver, not a sales organization. This is true regardless of its distribution through wholesale partners or DTC. Doing business with department stores requires that a brand perform to certain sales and margin expectations. If you can’t make the wholesale partner perform, you won’t get the forward investment you want. On top of this, department stores are eager to take inventory and promote it. There’s little risk to them since the brand needs to ensure margins and sell-through’s are adequate. The question is who is fooling who?

Brands have to solve this problem by developing their teams to work with their wholesale partners as a portfolio manager does with her capital. Thinking that inventory grows on trees is an incredibly bad idea. Inventory is the biggest investments a wholesale brand makes with its capital. Businesses get strapped for cash when they have too much inventory invested that doesn’t move. No brand has gone bankrupt because they had too little inventory. Probably the worst effect of too much goods in too many places is that it destroys any sense of consumer demand. Why buy at full-price when clearly this shit has to be marked down to move out the door? Consumers are smart and they’ve been well trained. This problem however, can be solved by business managers or account partners that think through the problems.

I should clarify that this doesn’t mean changing the titles of your sales team. That won’t work. Having business managers means training and coaching, as well as finding new talent that has this acumen. It also requires time and discipline. The process is highly trainable. Existing sales teams are often very good at managing relationships with wholesale partners, and planning teams often have the quantitative skill set necessary to execute a proactive forecasting efforts. This is a mindset effort that needs to be addressed by leadership, and innovative leaders will quickly see the benefits to developing teams that problem-solve their businesses to execute with certainty and clarity and drive sales while expanding gross margins by vigorously managing inventory cycles.

Brands of the future will be margin-makers, not cost-cutters.

 

Critical path 2 = PLAN BY CYCLE, NOT BY CATEGORY.

On a long tail business like fashion, where goods are committed into production many months before they’re available for purchase, planning by classification and category was the norm. Many brands currently have planning and allocations teams that buy future products in bulk then distribute those goods to stores and channels once they are getting closer to being delivered to the warehouse for distribution.

The thinking of planning and allocating is that teams can review current selling trends and flow products accordingly to stores and channels that “need” the inventory. The challenge is that this effort often results in a mishmosh of products delivered to stores at various times and inventory control becomes highly reactive. In my experience, these businesses typically have the worst inventory management in place.

Planning and allocating goods is the equivalent of day trading. The best planning teams act more like portfolio managers. These teams do extensive research and analysis to determine how to best place and distribute products across various doors and channels while protecting an assortment that enhances the brand’s sensibility. Once that path is set, only minor adjustments are done and usually only to offset production changes.

Meanwhile fast-fashion brands like Zara have taken the industry by storm because they react to trends quickly and can get production to stores in a handful of weeks. Zara is a vertical operator and has the technologies to do what few other brands can do. For almost all other brands, especially those distributing through wholesale partners, trying to accelerate the time to market is an unlikely, and frankly an unnecessary endeavor. The fact is that just because you can drive faster, it doesn’t mean you can drive better.

Cycle-centric planning in a methodology that plans products according to lifecycle rather than category or classification. Some products live year-round, others need to live only a few weeks, and still others can live for a season. Being able to plan those businesses accordingly allows a brand to focus its efforts on ensuring maximized sales of replenish-able products over an extended period of time. The best brands will work to minimize inventory in the stores and at their retailers and focus on just-in-time delivery across all product categories.

The effort essentially works to utilize a wholesale partner’s stores and digital presence as a model stock of inventory, and then replenishing long-tail products as necessary. Short-tail products, which are fast-fashion and directional, should be planned and placed to sell-through quickly and be gone. The ability to incorporate this methodology to planning a business is significant. Cycle-centric planning is designed to accelerate turns, greatly reduce markdowns, and allow greater focus on how a brand articulates newness and seasonal assortments through retail partners.

Executing a cycle-centric process requires training, but more importantly it requires critical thinking and buy-in from management. One of the hardest things for management teams to do is work towards a proactive acumen as opposed to reactive jumble. The results of enabling a cycle-centric process would provide management much greater visibility into forward sales and margin potential while also enabling much greater control of promotional activities and cadence.

While marketing teams focus on omni-channel efforts to ensure a seamless shopping experience across multiple channels of business for a brand’s consumers, brands likewise need to focus on turning sales teams into account partners and giving planning teams the ability to develop cycle-centric methods that will certainly enhance the entire omni-channel experience.

Wholesale isn’t broken, just poorly managed — Intro

 

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I’m going to embark on a lengthy series of posts about the wholesale business as it relates to fashion apparel, accessories, and footwear. It’s a big deal because the fashion industry is in dire straights at the moment and many brands are blaming the wholesale business as a key contributor.

Brands like Diane Von Furstenberg, Ralph Lauren (NYSE:RL), Nike (NYSE:NKE), Michael Kors (NYSE:KORS), Coach (NYSE:COH), Rag and Bone, and many, many others sell products to department stores like Macy’s (NYSE:M), Nordstrom (NYSE:JWN), and Bloomingdales, as well as Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) for that matter. The process of brands designing and producing products that are then sold in large quantities to retailers, including department stores and specialty stores, and whether online or through bricks and mortar, is called wholesale. Many, if not most brands are wholesalers and pretty much every wholesaler will tell you that the model is broken. Many including the 800 pound gorillas like Michael Kors and Coach are slowly exiting vast parts of their wholesale business from big retailers like Bloomingdales and Nordstrom. The reason? Doing business with department stores is killing them.

Naturally I have a somewhat different point of view. After being in the industry for many years and working on both sides of the wholesale/retail spectrum for some of the largest and most successful brands and retailers, I know first hand the tactics and strategies both sides of the industry use to conduct business with each other. My position is that wholesale isn’t broken, it’s just poorly managed. A hammer isn’t broken because you don’t know how to use it. Hammers are not defective because you continue to bash your fingers and pound holes in a wall. Don’t blame the tool, blame the focus.

The key to any optimal path of performance is knowing how to use your tools and technologies well along with logic and instinct. What is broken in the wholesale industry is its acumen. Both wholesalers and retailers continue to use and promote a business acumen that is poorly managed, weakly aligned, and severely outdated. So yes while department stores have indeed been killing business at many wholesalers, virtually all wholesalers have enabled the crime. Wholesalers and retailers are in a co-dependent relationship.

Something to keep in mind is that the fashion industry is an extremely complicated business. Many people think fashion is as simple as designing some great products, developing a cute marketing campaign, and then selling it to people in stores and online. It’s much more complicated than that. Think about what it takes to sell one shoe. More likely than not that shoe comes in several colors–black, brown, red, navy, etc. That shoe may also have several iterations of treatment—hardware, patterns, embellishments, and so on. Next factor in that in order to sell 1 shoe, you have to have 12 different sizes (multiple that by 2 or 3 if you include widths). So the complexity of fashion is this: take one style in multiple colors, with different treatments across many sizes, and then distribute it to hundreds if not thousands of stores, as well as across digital platforms, and what do you get? A big freaking headache if not well managed.

1 STYLE * 3 COLORS * 12 SIZES * 1200 DOORS = 43,200 UNIT INVESTMENT

But wait, it’s still not that simple. Some colors sell much better than others. There’s a vast difference in sales volumes generated in all the different stores. Climatic zones affect selling. Seasons affect sales. Demographics affect sales. Competition affects selling. And of course let’s not forget that trends affect selling. The bottomline is that the complexity of the fashion industry is immense. It’s why I’ve been drawn to it my entire career. If you think about it, fashion is as complicated as the capital markets. Trading stocks or commodities requires a broad set of skills and insights in order to know what to trade, how much to trade, when to trade it, and when to dispose of it in order to maximize upside and minimize downside. A good portfolio manager manages inventory (cash) in order to perform better than the market. If he or she does that well, a lot of money is made. If he or she does that poorly, a lot of money is lost. A merchant in the fashion industry likewise has to know how to allocate and managed a swiftly moving torrent of investments in a broad range of categories, styles, channels, and doors in order to maximize her returns while minimizing her risks.

The wholesale channel has a great purpose. Regardless of decreases in traffic to stores, there are millions and millions of people who shop in malls and at stores. Department and specialty stores offer a broad range of products and brands to consumers and that’s important. Furthermore, department and specialty stores are not the only option for wholesale. Amazon is a wholesale model, and they have quickly grown to be an 800 lbs gorilla in the industry. So walking away or moving away from the wholesale business is a lot like the statement Henry Ford said about advertising when he said “a man who stops advertising to save money is like a man who stops a clock to save time.” Brands should not walk away from wholesale, it has to be re-imagined and it needs to be utilized more effectively.

I’ll try to make these prolific posts as entertaining as possible. There is a great deal of complexity to fashion beyond the fashion. A lot of smart and well intentioned people work hard day in and day out trying to right this ship. My hope is that the industry begins to spend more time using data and technology to make fashion fashionable once again. The way business is done between brands and retailers has to be approached from a different angle. Less combative, more collaborative. Training and technology are a must. We need an industry that has the creative powers of New York City, Paris, and Milan combined with the marketing brilliance of Madison Avenue and the business acumen of Silicon Valley.

Ultimately we need an industry that trusts data more than opinion, and minimizes emotion in favor of logic. James Barksdale, former President and CEO of Netscape, said it best when he said, “If we have data, let’s look at data. If all we have are opinions, let’s go with mine.” Furthermore data needs to be complemented with logic. In 2010 the global apparel industry produced 150 billion garments. Yet there are less than 3 billion people on the planet that have the means to consume those goods. Nothing about producing 150 billion garments for fewer than 3 billion people is logical. The fashion industry’s greatest challenge is not under-consumption, but rather over-production. Less goods produced does not mean less sales obtained. Conversely it mean more full-price sales generated at higher gross margins and with less waste to the landfills.

Getting all of this right doesn’t have to be as hard as many have made it out to be. In fact the hardest thing to do is to make something simple, and simple works better than complicated things. The way to make something simple is to break critical steps into small, digestible parts with a focus on the handful of key signals that are critical to the operation. Even the best brain surgeons will tell you their work isn’t complicated when it’s broken down into little steps. That’s my goal. My goal is to identify and outline the handful of key signals, steps, and procedures a brand or retailers needs in order to become nimble, proactive, healthy and successful with a modern consumer.

Some, if not all, of these posts will be a lot of my ramblings. That’s the point of a blog and it does have my name on it so I apologize to you now. I’ll do my best to edit excess verbiage and focus the points around cohesive ideas. But one thing I’ve learned is that there is no easy path to success or brilliance. There’s a bunch of great ways to lose weight fast, but few ways to stay healthy forever unless it becomes part of who you are. Don’t look for easy answers, but there will be many quick-fixes. There are some fundamental things that brands and retailers can do quickly to find immediate results. Look for them and you’ll find them in the coming posts. But ultimately nothing happens without execution and that’s up to you in all cases.

All this being said, I hope and expect to learn from my readers. Be sure to pass this on to people you think would have something to gain from reading it, people you think would have much to add to it, and people you think would be pissed off that I wrote it. It’s all good. I do this to grow and hope you do as well.